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I. Introduction 
 
The sublime has enjoyed a reawakening in the last few decades, 
especially in the works of postmodernists and in the rejuvenated 
scholarship on eighteenth and nineteenth century European aesthetics. 
In her recent article “Is a Theory of the Sublime Possible?” Jane Forsey 
has raised some very important concerns about these attempts at the 
resuscitation of the sublime. According to Forsey, these attempts all 
share a fundamental mistake: they assume that a theory of the sublime 
is possible. The sublime, she argues, cannot be theorized since there is 
nothing that such a theory could be a theory of: “sublimity” denotes 
something that, upon proper reflection, turns out to be either 
incoherent, contradictory, or “so limited that a general theory of the 
sublime will remain out of reach” (381). Forsey’s argument poses a 
difficult challenge to anyone who takes the sublime seriously, that is, 
for anyone who views sublimity as more than a quirk in the annals of 
European aesthetics. Nevertheless, I will argue that the challenge is not 
insurmountable. The aim of this paper is thus to defend the coherency 
of the sublime as a viable aesthetic category against Forsey’s challenge. 
I divide Forsey’s challenge into two paradoxes. The first paradox 
(P1)—which I call the transcendence paradox—is about the 
epistemological and ontological commitments that are implicated in 
sublimity. The second paradox (P2)—which I call the pleasure 
paradox—is about the affective content of sublimity. As we will see, 
while the first paradox is dissolvable, the second paradox maintains 
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some traction. But, far from leading us to conclude that a theory of the 
sublime is impossible, the latter paradox illuminates the avenues that 
should be explored in future theories and accounts of the sublime.   
 
II.1. P1: The Transcendence Paradox 
 
According to Forsey, who follows Guy Sircello’s (1993) analysis, the 
sublime involves two essential “themes.” The first theme, which is 
titled “epistemological transcendence,” posits that a deep kind of 
cognitive failure resides at the core of the experience of the sublime. 
In a sublime experience we are confronted with an object that resists 
our conceptual grasp; the object of sublime experience is completely 
epistemologically inaccessible to us. The second theme, “ontological 
transcendence,” posits that the inaccessible object of sublime 
experience is in some sense ontologically transcendent, i.e., the object 
exists beyond “all of humankind’s possible environments” (Sircello 
545).  
Here is the paradox: the two themes are in an irresolvable 
conflict with one another. How could we ever have an experience of 
an object that transcends all of our “possible environments”? Such an 
object could not, in principle, be the intentional object of any 
experience. And, if we do have an experience of such an object, we 
could not consistently commit to saying that it is epistemologically 
transcendent. In any case, it must be knowable or accessible in some 
sense if we can assert that it exists. The transcendence paradox, then, 
is this: theories of the sublime are caught in a double bind. If the theory 
is centered on the experience of cognitive failure—the epistemology of 
the sublime—it is left bereft of the possibility of telling us what the 
experience “is an experience of,” as Forsey says, and if the theory is 
centered on the transcendent object—the ontology of the sublime—it 
needs to show how any sort of experience of such an object is even 
possible, let alone how it could be given any sort of description or a 
positive existential status (383). If we accept these terms, we are forced 
to conclude, Forsey claims, that the very idea of a sublime experience 
is incoherent and thus cannot be theorized. It is incoherent since no 
experience could simultaneously involve “epistemological 
transcendence” and “ontological transcendence” (the intentional 
object) that constitute the core of sublimity.1  
The paradox cannot be solved, Forsey claims, by noting that 
the sublime often takes entities from nature as its intentional objects, 
e.g., ominous mountain precipices, erupting volcanoes, and so on. If 
natural objects are the intentional objects of sublime experience, we 
end up with a stark contradiction. This is simply because mountains, 
oceans, and natural scenery are not epistemologically inaccessible at all. 
 
1 It should be noted that, as we will see, although Sircello articulates the paradox, he does 
not think it is decisive. He thinks that a theory of the sublime remains a possibility, whereas 
Forsey does not.  
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The intentional object, in these cases, winds up being “both 
transcendent and familiar” (383). In other words, the sublime in nature 
still remains mired in paradox.  
 
II.2. Responding to P1: The Procrustean Bed 
 
In response to the transcendence paradox I will argue that the Forsey-
Sircello analysis forces the sublime into a procrustean bed. In 
establishing this, I will advance three claims: (a) the analysis 
unnecessarily confines the sublime as such to an epistemological mode, 
that is to say, it disregards the non-epistemological modes of sublimity; 
(b) moreover, the analysis provides an unnecessarily strong 
interpretation of the epistemological mode; and (c) even if the strong 
interpretation is correct, it is unclear whether the conclusion about the 
incoherency of the sublime follows (although Forsey’s conclusion that 
a theory cannot accommodate cases where the strong interpretation 
does apply might still be correct).    
First, the Forsey-Sircello analysis reduces the sublime entirely 
to its epistemological mode. This is unwarranted since the sublime is 
not always, let alone necessarily, taken to involve epistemological 
transcendence. Contra the Forsey-Sircello analysis—and especially 
taking into consideration the accounts of Kant and Burke—sublimity 
has been commonly bifurcated into the “mathematical” and 
“dynamical” modes.2 Forsey’s attack seems to be geared more towards 
the former while leaving the latter almost entirely unaddressed.  The 
mathematical sublime, as Kant explains, is principally concerned with 
the aesthetic estimation of size. The subject is confronted with 
something that is so immense and so vast such that it cannot fully 
cognize the object; the imagination cannot comprehend the object in 
its totality or synthesize it into a single intuition, e.g., as in 
Schopenhauer’s example, when “the heavens at night actually bring 
innumerable worlds before our eyes” (WWR I, 205).  This experience 
of cognitive failure comes with an unpleasant feeling of puzzlement, 
disorientation, incomprehension, or, in other words, an intimation of 
our epistemic limitations. The dynamical sublime, on the other hand, 
is concerned with the aesthetic estimation of power. The experience of 
dynamical sublimity does not (necessarily or primarily) involve 
cognitive failure, but rather a certain kind of physical failure instead. It 
involves (in part) a sense of fearfulness, terror, powerlessness, 
“irresistible force” (Burke 1990, II.I, 53), and so on. As Burke explains,  
 
Whatever is fitted … to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, 
 
2 The distinction between the mathematical and the dynamical sublime comes specifically 
from Kant, but it is not unrecognizable in earlier accounts. It is true that this taxonomy of 
the sublime is somewhat arbitrary, but the point is to show that cognitive failure 
(epistemology) is not central to the sublime, pace Forsey and Sircello. There is admittedly a 
lingering question about the relation between the different modes of sublimity: in virtue of 
what are they all modes of the same thing, i.e., the sublime?    
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whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or 
operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime (1990, 
I.VII, 36).  
 
And there are, of course, plenty of objects both in nature and art that 
can evoke this deep experience of physical failure. These objects and 
representations are powerful, fearful, threatening, and terrifying, but 
they are not (completely) incomprehensible or epistemically 
inaccessible—they do not resist and humiliate us as knowers but, 
rather, as embodied actors. The emphasis on terror, we should note, 
was already becoming a central aspect in (proto) theories of the 
sublime in the tail end of the seventeenth century, for example, in the 
writings of John Dennis. Dennis described terror as “a Disturbance of 
Mind, proceeding from an Apprehension of an approaching Evil, 
threatening Destruction of very great Trouble either to us or to ours 
… Things that are powerful, and likely to hurt, are the Causes of 
Common Terror, and the more they are powerful, and likely to hurt, 
the more they become the cause of Terror; which Terror, the greater 
it is, the more it is joined with Wonder, and the earlier it comes to 
Astonishment” (quoted in Monk 1960, 52). Indeed, Burke’s theory 
itself is primarily concerned with the emotion of terror and the qualities 
that, he claims, tend to evoke it: vastness, obscurity, privations, 
darkness, power, and so on. Terror is the “ruling principle” of the 
sublime, he says (1990, II.II, 54). So if the transcendence paradox 
renders sublime experience incoherent, then it at best only succeeds to 
do so in relation to one mode of sublime experience: the 
epistemological mode. It has no clear grip on the experience of 
dynamical sublimity, i.e., sublimity in its non-epistemic mode. Forsey 
has not done enough to show why any possible theory of the dynamical 
sublime, like that of Burke’s, must also “rest on a mistake.”3 Burke’s 
account might be wrong, of course, but that does not mean powerful 
and threatening objects and our mixed, negative-positive responses to 
them cannot be theorized at all.       
Second, and more importantly, Forsey and Sircello, in setting 
up the paradox, make an unwarranted assumption even in relation to 
sublime experience in its epistemological mode. They provide an 
overly strong interpretation according to which sublimity involves the 
presentation of an intentional object that is wholly epistemologically 
transcendent, that is, the intentional object is taken to be such that it 
cannot be cognized at all. If that is truly the intentional object of 
sublime experience, there is no surprise that theories of the sublime 
tend to devolve into incoherency and contradiction; they are 
attempting to describe an impossible experience. But sublimity in its 
 
3 Forsey does have more to say about Kant’s account of the sublime, including its dynamical 
mode. She agrees that it does not fall prey to the paradox and is, therefore, not incoherent or 
contradictory, but is nevertheless unsatisfactory because it does posit an odd ontological 
entity (i.e., the noumenal subject) and it requires us to reduce the sublime to the rest of 
Kant’s architectonic.  
5 
 
epistemological mode does not require us to posit the intentional 
object as wholly epistemically transcendent. The cognitive failure in 
sublime experience can be one of partial epistemic inaccessibility.4 For 
example, Forsey misunderstands Burke’s claim that the mind “cannot 
reason on the [sublime] object that employs it” (1990, II.I, 53; see 
Forsey, 381). Burke, in this context, does not mean to say that the 
object cannot be cognitively grasped at all. He means to say that it 
cannot be grasped clearly. Burke explains that  
 
No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and 
reasoning as fear … To make any thing very terrible, obscurity in general 
seems to be necessary. When we know the full extent of any danger, when 
we can accustom our eyes to it, a great deal of apprehension vanishes (my 
emphasis; 1990, II.II, 53-4).  
 
Burke is only claiming that the object is obscure. He is not claiming 
that it is epistemologically inaccessible. So, while it is true that the 
imagination is said to be stretched to its limits in many examples of 
sublimity, that is not to say that the object that is encountered in such 
an experience is always taken to be absolutely inaccessible to human 
cognition tout court. Forsey’s attack is therefore misguided because it 
unjustifiably forces sublime experience to conform to the strong 
interpretation she provides. A theory of the sublime need not account 
for the type of “epistemological transcendence” she and Sircello are 
concerned with since it is not an essential or core component of 
sublimity.5  
Finally, however, a question remains about cases of sublime 
experience where the strong interpretation does seem to apply. The 
paradigmatic cases I have in mind are found in religious discourse. 
Sircello himself uses a number of these in explicating the paradox. He 
discusses, for instance, the Pseudo-Dionysius’ mystical account of the 
experience of God. The Pseudo-Dionysus describes the revelation of 
God as bringing to “a halt to the activities of our minds, and to the 
extent that is proper, [approaching] the ray that transcends being” 
(Sircello 544).6 The religious experience of God, the Pseudo-Dionysus 
 
4 Sircello hints at this possibility, but does not pursue it (547). 
5 Forsey could respond that even “partial epistemic transcendence” leads into contradiction, 
since there is nothing epistemically transcendent about mountains and raging oceans at all. 
These objects do not involve the slightest bit of epistemic transcendence. This is true in at 
least one sense: we know with certainty the kinds of objects we are encountering, e.g., 
thunderstorm, oceans, and so on. But, in another sense, once we agree that the sublime 
object does not have to be completely beyond our grasp we become open to finding ways in 
which it may transcend our cognitive capacities to some degree after all. Paul Crowther 
(2010, 181-187) suggests that in some cases of mathematical sublimity we cannot fully 
comprehend the interrelations between all the parts of the object we are confronted with, 
although we may nevertheless recognize the type of object the parts belong to (e.g., a 
mountain). This can be a form of partial epistemic transcendence. The sublime, in these 
cases, is something that falls on a spectrum rather than being a zero-sum game, as Forsey 
and Sircello make it out to be.    
6 The mention of the Pseudo-Dionysus might seem odd, especially to those who share the 
belief that the sublime is confined to a particular historical period, most notably, eighteenth 
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continues, “is of a kind that neither intelligence nor speech can lay hold 
of…since it surpasses everything and is wholly beyond our capacity to 
know it” (ibid). The transcendence paradox seems unavoidable in this 
case, since it seems rather clear that the two themes of the sublime are 
united in the Pseudo-Dionysus’ account: the experience of God is 
wholly epistemically transcendent and the object of the experience—
namely, God—is wholly ontologically transcendent.  
But even here, in the religious cases, the paradox can be 
resisted. Wayne Proudfoot has argued that the term “God” functions 
in a prescriptive rather than a descriptive way in the Pseudo-Dionysus 
(1985, 125). It does not describe or denote an ontologically 
transcendent being but rather serves as a way of resisting any such 
denotation or description. The absolute ineffability of God does not 
describe the phenomenological content of sublime experience in this 
case, but is rather a grammatical rule that denies its reducibility to any 
possible symbolic system, label, or determinate description. 
Ineffability, which Proudfoot (following William James) considers to 
be a primary marker of mystical experience, is always a relative matter: 
“X” is ineffable only in relation to some symbolic system or other. For 
instance, tactile sensations are ineffable relative to color sensations. 
The color of a jellyfish cannot adequately capture its viscous feel. 
Claiming that “God is ineffable” is not predicating ineffability to God. 
That would be a contradiction. It is, instead, prescribing a rule for 
identifying an experience as a mystical one: God—along with other 
religious terms, like Tao and Brahman—serves as a “formulae that rule 
out in advance the appropriateness or adequacy of any description or 
adequacy of any description that might be proposed” (Proudfoot 1985, 
129). When put in this way, the sublime experience alluded to in 
mystical discourse seems to come rather close to Sircello’s own 
proposed solution to the paradox, specifically, his revised 
interpretation of epistemological transcendence:  
 
[F]or any possible given set of routes of epistemological access to 
“reality,” that is insufficient to provide a complete understanding or grasp 
of “the real” (549). 
 
The revised interpretation is meant to evade the problems that emerge 
for a theory of the sublime once an ontologically transcendent object 
is posited. It redirects attention only to the ways in which the limitation 
of human understanding is experienced. Is this a successful retort on 
behalf of these cases? Forsey thinks not. This is partly because, as 
Forsey explains towards the end of her paper, “While such descriptions 
or expressions may be evocative, they do nothing for a purported 
theory of the sublime” (388). In other words, whereof one cannot 
speak, thereof one must pass over in silence. The ‘mystical sublime’ 
 
and nineteenth century British and German Romanticism, as Mary Mothersill (1984) and 
James Elkins (2011) believe. I reject this view. The sublime, I think, denotes an experience 
that predates the term “sublime.” But I will not argue for this view here.  
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cannot answer the most important questions that a theory of the 
sublime is called to address, e.g., “What kinds of objects are sublime?” 
and “What does the sublime tell us about ourselves as subjects?” 
(Forsey 388).7 I am inclined to agree with Forsey that the mystical 
sublime cannot be theorized in a satisfactory sense, but this does not 
rule out the possibility of theorizing the sublime as such, as I hope to 
have made clear. We need not take “epistemological transcendence” 
(or ontological transcendence) to be the central or unifying theme of 
sublimity and, hence, accounting for it should not be taken as an 
obvious desideratum of a theory of the sublime. Claiming otherwise is 
forcing the sublime into a procrustean bed.    
 Nevertheless, Forsey’s questions retain some force. I think that 
the motivation behind the questions she poses, and hence what I take 
to be the real thrust of her critique, is to challenge the theorist to 
adequately explain what is distinctive about sublimity if it is not going to 
be epistemological or ontological transcendence. The importance of 
Forsey’s article lies partly in shifting the burden back onto the theorists. 
In the remainder of this paper I want to explore this issue by 
addressing Forsey’s critique of Malcolm Budd’s theory. As I will 
explain, Forsey attempts to saddle Budd’s account of sublimity with 
two problems. The first problem concerns the object, while the second 
concerns the affective experience that the subject undergoes. The 
second problem, what I call the “pleasure paradox,” will take up the 
bulk of the discussion.    
     
III.1. P2: The Pleasure Paradox 
 
According to Forsey, Budd’s account can be read as a variation of 
Sircello’s “revised thesis.”8 Budd’s theory, like Sircello’s revised thesis, 
does not posit any bizarre ontological entities and remains focused on 
the subject’s experience. Budd’s description of the sublime experience 
is as follows:  
 
With the sudden dropping away … of our everyday sense of the 
importance of our self and its numerous concerns and projects, or the 
normal sense of the security of our body from external natural forces, the 
heightened awareness of our manifest vulnerability and insignificance … 
 
7 It is worth noting that Forsey never explains what she means by a “theory” of the sublime. 
This remains an ambiguity in her paper. Sircello does provide an answer to this question. For 
him, a theory of the sublime is an account of its object, i.e., the object that is called 
“sublime” (545). However, towards the end of his paper, Sircello seems to abandon this view 
when he says that a theory of the sublime may still be possible if we go with the revised 
epistemological thesis and stop ourselves from making any ontological commitments 
whatsoever, that is, if we leave the object out of the theory (549).        
8 I think it is misleading to read Budd this way. It is true that his account avoids “ontological 
transcendence” and is therefore aligned with Sircello’s revised thesis. But, on the other hand, 
Budd’s account is not purely epistemological. Like Kant and Burke, he also discusses 
powerful phenomena in nature that pose an existential threat to human life. Forsey does 
seem to recognize this but she uses Budd’s account as a target for showing why Sircello’s 
revised (epistemological) thesis won’t do.  
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is, after the initial shock, experienced with pleasure (2003, 85). 
 
The focus of this account is on the experience of being overwhelmed 
by some object in nature and coming to a kind of pleasurable 
awareness of one’s vulnerability and the limitations of one’s powers as 
a natural being. Budd’s theory—unlike Kant and the German 
idealists—does not flee into the comfort of the “supersensible” 
(whether it is God, moral freedom, or the ideas of reason). He remains 
on earth. But this is also what leads his theory into trouble, according 
to Forsey. The problems that Budd’s theory faces can be usefully 
formulated through a deeper comparison with Kant’s own theory.9   
  On Kant’s account, as it is commonly interpreted, judgments 
of sublimity, i.e., judgments of the form “X is sublime,” are ultimately 
explained through a connection that Kant sets up between the 
experience of sensory frustration (cognitive or practical) and the 
“supersensible side” of our being: our freedom as moral beings or the 
“ideas of reasons” and our capacity to think them.10 The sublime 
experience consists of an exhilarating kind of “negative pleasure” 
(Kant 2000, §23, 5:245) that is felt upon a (safe) encounter with objects 
in nature that are overwhelmingly powerful, terrifying, formless, vast, 
or incomprehensible: the starry heavens, erupting volcanoes, a stormy 
ocean, and so on. For Kant, these objects are especially well-suited for 
generating that anxiety-laden elevation of the soul that constitutes the 
feeling of the sublime. The explanation for this is that these sorts of 
objects provide us with a kind of intimation or feeling of the rational 
“vocation” of the mind (2000, §28, 5:262). As natural beings we are 
dwarfed by nature, but as rational beings we transcend it.11 In the case 
of the dynamical sublime, for example, Kant writes,  
 
nature is judged as sublime not insofar as it arouses fear, but rather 
because it calls forth our power (which is not part of nature) to regard 
those things about which we are concerned (goods, health, and life) as 
trivial, and hence to regard its power (to which we are, to be sure, 
subjected in regard to those things) as not the sort of dominion over 
ourselves and our authority to which we would have to bow if it came 
down to our highest principles and their affirmation or abandonment 
(2000, §28, 5:262).  
 
According to Kant’s theory, the distinctive exhilaration of the 
sublime—the feeling of our “power” being called forth by nature—is 
explained through this connection with our moral or rational capacities 
as supersensible beings. One might argue on behalf of Kant that the 
 
9 Budd himself builds his account through a critical discussion of Kant’s theory of the 
sublime (66-89).  
10 See chapter 13 of Henry Alison’s Kant’s Theory of Taste (2001). 
11 Kant does not think we are always explicitly aware of this in sublime experience. Instead, 
Kant is more concerned with providing a transcendental account of the sublime, that is, he is 
explaining what makes sublime experience (and judgments) possible. For more, see Robert 
Clewis’ The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom (2009), especially 72-79 and 219-226. 
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threatening and incomprehensible objects found in nature are uniquely 
capable of evoking this kind of pleasure because they (unlike most of 
the objects of culture) are so clearly and powerfully indifferent and 
sometimes even contrary to human ends, values, and concerns. The 
ways in which these objects conjure up our puniness, powerlessness, 
and fleetingness as natural creatures can only be offset by summoning 
up, if only implicitly, our infinitely greater powers as supra-natural 
creatures: as self-determining, autonomous, free, and rational, moral 
beings.   
Budd’s theory, like Kant’s, places the locus of the sublime in 
the self. But, unlike Kant, Budd does not take our rational “vocation” 
to be the redemptive or pleasurable basis of sublimity. The explanatory 
buck of his theory of the sublime seems to stop with the feeling of 
vulnerability itself. According to Forsey, this is what leads Budd’s 
theory into serious trouble. Forsey singles out two particular problems, 
but, as I mentioned above, I will devote most of the attention to the 
one I take to be more decisive: the pleasure paradox.12 
The first problem has to do (once again) with the object of the 
sublime. As Forsey argues, on Budd’s account, any object at all could 
be the potential object of sublimity so long as it leads us to feel the 
kind of pleasurable vulnerability he describes (386). Thus the ‘sublime’ 
might arise when I am faced with, say, an especially difficult math 
problem or a crossword puzzle that I am incapable of solving or if I 
narrowly escape a traffic accident and so on (see Forsey 386). Forsey 
thinks this is fatal for a theory of the sublime. Her reasoning seems to 
be motivated, at least in part, by thinking that a theory of the sublime 
should strive to preserve the strong historical connection between 
nature and sublimity, a connection that persists in Budd’s own account 
for that matter. So, she claims, since “Budd’s rejection of Kant’s moral 
goals causes us to lose the initial reasons for focusing on the vast, 
formless, and threatening aspects of nature alone,” his theory cannot 
be a satisfactory one (386). But, as I see it, there is no real problem 
here. First, as we already know, sublimity has been attached to many 
types of objects other than natural ones, including spiritual or divine 
entities, artworks, architecture, ideas, moral exemplars, and so on.13 
And, second, the things that make these objects evocative of the 
sublime in the first place are certain qualities that they have rather than 
the types that they belong to. They can be overwhelming in their size, 
power, or greatness (etc.) such that they evoke the mixed emotional 
response that is characteristic of the sublime in the subject who 
experiences them. It is the qualities that are at issue, not the types of 
objects that these qualities are attached to.14 We should, of course, 
 
12 The pleasure paradox is not a central part of Forsey’s general critique of the sublime, but it 
is a key reason she employs for rejecting Budd’s account. It is also worth considering given 
its place in the history of the theoretical discourse on the sublime. 
13 But see Emily Brady, 2013, chapter 5, for the contrary view. Brady provides an argument 
for the view that the “original” sublime is found first and foremost in nature and not in art.  
14 It must be said, however, that the sublime depends on context. There are some things that 
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inquire about and attempt to theorize the qualities that are typically 
evocative of the sublime, but there is no reason (a) to think that these 
qualities can only be instantiated by objects in nature, or (b) that a 
theory of the sublime should only focus on these qualities when they 
are instantiated by objects in nature.15 And, once we recognize that it 
is the qualities that matter rather than the types, we can resist the claim 
that the sublime can be “anything at all” even if it is divorced from the 
exclusive domain of nature.     
The second problem—the pleasure paradox—is about the 
affective content of the sublime. Budd’s theory cannot explain how the 
initially and typically painful experience of vulnerability could give rise 
to the pleasurable aspect of the sublime. This paradox, I claim, is also 
related to Budd’s rejection of the “supersensible” elements in Kant’s 
account. For Kant, as we saw, the sublime is pleasurable because it 
involves shoring up our own powers as rational or moral beings vis-à-
vis nature. But, once this route is denied, it becomes unclear why 
becoming aware of our cosmic insignificance or impotence against the 
forces or magnitudes of nature should be pleasurable in any sense. So, 
the pleasure paradox is concerned with how it is that 
incomprehensible, threatening, or overwhelmingly powerful objects 
can come to be experienced in that peculiarly pleasurable way that 
characterizes sublimity.  
      
III.2. Responding to P2:  Human Agency 
 
The pleasure paradox is old and many solutions (some even already 
present in Longinus) have been offered in response to it.16 But here I 
want to critically examine one potential solution—offered in the recent 
works of Katerina Deligiorgi—that locates the pleasure of the sublime 
in the experience it affords us of our identity as human agents. I will 
argue that the solution does not work. But, as I claim in the concluding 
section, Deligiorgi’s article, along with Forsey’s, usefully points the way 
forward to future theories.   
Katerina Deligiorgi’s recent neo-Kantian theory of the sublime 
posits that the pleasure of the sublime comes from our getting a 
momentary and rare intimation of the nature of our agency as human 
beings situated in the world. The vulnerability that we experience at 
the hands of “contra-purposive” phenomena illuminates the ways in 
 
may be sublime for the ordinary human but will not be sublime for particular individuals, 
depending on their situation, their history, their culture, and so on. But this should not be 
seen as a serious problem for a theory of the sublime. If I happen to find the Egyptian 
pyramids more sublime than (say) my Egyptian tour guide, who has seen the pyramids on 
countless occasions, that does not mean my tour guide cannot recognize or agree with my 
judgment even if she herself is no longer moved by them in the same way as I am now.    
15 For a broader discussion of the place of the object in a theory of the sublime, see Robert 
Clewis’ “A Theory of the Sublime is Possible” in this issue. I should add, too, that none of 
this is to say that we can ever come up with strict principles or laws for evoking the sublime 
or cases where somebody must find some particular object to be sublime.  
16 See the first chapter of James Kirwan’s Sublimity (2005) for some of the early solutions to 
paradox, e.g., those proposed by Addison and Dennis, as well as their relation to Longinus.  
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which we are passive beings in relation to the world, but it equally 
illuminates the ways in which we are active in relation to the world as 
well—we are limited in some ways but capable in others. It frees us 
from an all-encompassing sense of responsibility towards the world as 
a whole, but also rejuvenates our sense of potentiality for successful 
action in our own lives. As Deligiorgi says, the pleasure is connected 
to the awareness of the mere “form” of our agency (2016, 201). She 
explains that  
 
The sublime affords us a practical release … we cannot do anything when 
confronted by the immeasurable and the terrifying, but, because we do 
not need to either, we become receptive to our identity as active beings 
… We are at one with ourselves insofar as we recognize ourselves as finite 
subjects of the experience (2016, 202).  
   
The pleasure of the sublime thus consists of a kind of satisfied 
contemplation of one’s proper place in the world: we are not gods, but 
we are not the playthings of nature either. Some things are in our 
power, while other things are not. 
Deligiorgi’s account, however, will not suffice for overcoming 
the pleasure paradox. I have two reasons for suspecting this: (a) it is 
difficult to see why an awareness of one’s agency (in Deligiorgi’s sense) 
would be experienced with pleasure at all, especially in paradigmatic 
cases of the sublime. In these cases, I would argue, the obstacles we 
confront represent (if only indirectly) a serious threat to the things we 
care most deeply about. These objects provide us with the sense of our 
smallness, insignificance, and mortality.  Insofar as the objects of the 
sublime can be linked to death and annihilation, they make us feel like 
the playthings of nature where we would like most to feel like gods. 
Or, to put it more mildly and in Deligiorgi’s terms, the sublime 
emphasizes our passivity where we would like most to feel our activity. 
True, one may still recognize, as Deligiorgi claims, that there are some 
things one can accomplish. But it is not satisfying to recognize that I 
can accomplish some minor ends if I simultaneously recognize I cannot 
accomplish my highest ends. Contemplating one’s place in the world as 
an agent is not a pleasurable experience, if the place one occupies is 
characterized by a lack of practical control or a state of total epistemic 
darkness in relation to the things that matter to us. This is why the 
content of our “identity as active beings” matters to a theory of the 
sublime. We need to recall that the objects of the sublime are contra-
purposive, i.e., they pose a resistance to our ends in some sense or 
other. Some ends and values are, on the whole, more important and 
central to our lives as human beings than other ends and values. And (b) 
even if this sort of awareness should lead to some kind of pleasure, it 
is unclear why it should produce a rapturous exhilaration and not, 
instead, the quieter pleasures of stoic resolve or resignation or even a 
shrug of the shoulders. Taken together, (a) and (b) demonstrate that if 
we follow Deligiorgi’s view we do not end up with a satisfactory theory 
12 
 
of the sublime since we are left bereft of a clear explanation for how it 
is possible to experience with pleasurable exhilaration objects that pose 
or represent a deep threat to the ends that matter to us most—e.g., the 
achievement of a deep understanding of the world, living up to the 
demands of morality, leading a happy life, alleviating the suffering of 
others, and so on.17  
 
III.3. Conclusion 
 
Forsey’s important article raises serious questions about the possibility 
of generating a theory of the sublime. But, as I hope to have shown, 
the main paradox that motivates her (and Sircello’s) critique does not 
present a decisive case against such a possibility. The “transcendence 
paradox,” as I have called it, forces the sublime into a procrustean bed 
by reducing it to an overly-strong epistemological mode.18 But, while 
the transcendence paradox can be overcome, the pleasure paradox has 
turned out to pose an ongoing problem. I do not have the space to 
survey all the solutions that have been proposed to the paradox, but 
the problems encountered in Deligiorgi’s theory—which is the most 
recent solution on offer—show that the paradox remains a live one. In 
any case, none of this should dissuade us from thinking that a theory 
of the sublime is possible. It simply poses a demand to clarify and 
explain the affective content of sublimity and its source. The 
distinctiveness of the sublime, I think, will ultimately rest in clarifying 
its affective content and the relation it holds to objects in the world. 
The sublime does tell us something interesting about what it means to 
be human. We are peculiar animals who can aesthetically appreciate 
and take pleasure in things (nature and artifacts) that, in virtue of their 
sheer power or magnitude, seem to contradict our cognitive, sensory, 
and existential aims and capacities. As long as we continue to be moved 
in this way the sublime will retain its relevance for our self-
understanding.   
In concluding this paper, I want to briefly explain how 
Deligiorgi’s and Forsey’s articles can help us set down some criteria 
that a theory of the sublime should meet. First, our theory should be 
able to explain the pleasurable-painful character of the experience 
without neglecting either side of the affective divide. Some theories 
unjustly drop the negative emotions in favor of the positive ones, while 
other theories unjustly focus on the negative emotions and lose track 
of the positive ones. Deligiorgi’s theory, to its merit, does not fall into 
 
17 For a longer discussion and critique of Deligiorgi’s paper, see Hanauer 2016. See 
Deligiorgi 2016 for a reply. 
18 It is not so clear that Forsey still accepts the conclusions of her 2007 paper. In a more 
recent work on the still life paintings of Chardin, Forsey writes, “Chardin disconcerts 
because in a simple pot and two onions, we are faced with the limits of language, the limits 
of understanding, and the limits of human experience.  His work is both puzzling and an 
“embarrassment” for his contemporaries because, rather than a reflection of the known, it 
suggests to us a vista that is ultimately unreachable.  In this way his work is not only 
beautiful; it is sublime” (2014).  
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this trap. The unpleasant aspect of the sublime is not negated or lost 
through the pleasurable feeling of our “higher purposiveness” as 
agents (to borrow Kant’s phrase). Instead, the painful aspect opens us 
up to something we can take pleasure in, namely, our identity as finite 
agents, without the displeasure being completely extinguished in the 
process. Second, Forsey’s article usefully shows us why a theory of the 
sublime should not lose track of the object. The feeling and judgment 
of the sublime is responsive to an object in the world. Kant (as he is 
usually read) and many of his followers take the ‘true object’ of the 
sublime to be ourselves, as we have seen. The problem is that this does 
not conform to the way in which we ordinarily think about aesthetic 
appreciation. When we appreciate something as “sublime,” we take the 
object to be the proper bearer of the aesthetic predicate rather than 
ourselves. When I call a storm at sea “sublime,” I am not confusedly 
referring to myself instead. The object is the bearer of aesthetic value, 
and a theory of the sublime—assuming that we now agree one is 
possible—should be able to accommodate this commonsense 
intuition.  
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